We introduce a synthetic control methodology to study policies with staggered adoption. Many policies, such as the board gender quota, are replicated by other policy setters at different time frames. Our method estimates the dynamic average treatment effects on the treated using variation introduced by the staggered adoption of policies. Our method gives asymptotically unbiased estimators of many interesting quantities and delivers asymptotically valid inference. By using the proposed method and national labor data in Europe, we find evidence that quota regulation on board diversity leads to a decrease in part-time employment, and an increase in full-time employment for female professionals.
Introduction
In the political arena, many policies are adopted by learning or taking ideas from other policy setters (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) , which provide opportunities to study the effectiveness of a policy being adopted by multiple policy setters at varying time periods. In this paper we propose a new synthetic control method for policies with staggered adoption. We estimate a model for each unit using all other units by the synthetic control method, and then simultaneously estimate all unit × time treatment effects. By doing this, we avoid assuming too strong homogeneity across treatment effects like the generalized difference-in-difference, and use all important units in forming the synthetic control, even if some of them have already been treated.
Our proposed method overcomes limitations in two commonly used methodologies. First, the generalized difference-in-difference method, with a time and a unit fixed effect, is commonly used in settings with staggered adoption. The time fixed effect takes out common shocks for all units in each time period, mitigating the concern that the treatment effect is driven by confounding events. Conceptually, removing these time specific shocks, and unit time-invariant characteristics, we can examine treatment effects by aligning the effects by treatment time, assuming there is parallel trend among all units. However, recent econometric literature shows that in settings with dynamic treatment effects, the estimated treatment effects are difficult to interpret because the weights of the treatment effects can be negative (Borusyak and Jaravel, 2016; de Chaisemartin and D'Haultffuille, 2018; Goodman-Bacon, 2018; Abraham and Sun, 2018; Athey and Imbens, 2018; Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2018) .
The reason is the the generalized difference-in-different implicitly assumes strong homogeneity on the treatment effects. Further, in our setting where the outcomes are aggregated at the country-level, parallel trends often fail to hold. For example, we may not expect female employment in Norway to have the same trend as that in the United Kingdom.
The second commonly used method, synthetic control, mitigates some of the two limitations above, and are often used in comparative case studies with a moderate number of aggregated units (Abadie et al., 2010) . However, there is an issue when synthetic control is used in a staggered adoption setting: often the best candidates for synthetic control are those units that were treated at a different time period, yet current synthetic control methods only use units that are never treated as synthetic control candidates. In settings where majority of the units are treated at some point in time, synthetic control method may fail to construct a "good" synthetic control unit.
Further, we mainly focus on the dynamic effects of policies by looking at the average treatment effects on the treated for some periods after treatment (event-time ATT). That is, we are interested in how the effects evolve along the time after policies are implemented.
Our framework can be readily extended to other parameters of interest.
We apply the staggered synthetic control method to study the effects of board gender diversity policies introduced in a staggered time frame across 14 countries in EU. Two challenges motivate the use of staggered synthetic control in this setting. First, we are interested in the long run impact of the policies on employment outcomes. Since these outcome variables are available at the aggregated country level, the moderate number of observations may not fulfill the large sample assumption used in a generalized diff-in-diff asymptotics.
Generalized diff-in-diff, as discussed above, also does not correspond to meaningful estimates in dynamic treatment effects. Second, there are only few European countries with no policy yet, such as Cyprus and Malta, which tend to be smaller and less comparable to the treated European countries, such as France and Belgium. As such, using traditional synthetic control, we have limited control candidates.
Using our proposed methodology, we first show that corporate board female ratio increased significantly after the policy announcements. This increase is realized gradually from an average of 2% increase in the first year after the policy announcement, to 6% increase after four years. We then examine how the board gender policies affect labor outcomes related to gender equality. We study the extent to which female invests in their career by looking at part-time employment. If a higher female presentation at the board encourages other female employees in believing a weaker glass ceiling, these female employees may be less likely to switch from full-time to part-time employment for family reasons. We find evidence supporting this effect for the professional occupation group, where there is a 10% decrease in part-time female to male ratio, and around 4% increase in full-time female to male ratio. We do not observe similar effects, however, for workers and basic employees.
We aim to make two contributions. First, we propose an adaptation of the synthetic control methodology to allow other treated units to be part of the synthetic control. As discussed above, our methodology provides many advantages over alternative methods, particularly the ability to study dynamic effects. Second, we provide insights on the dynamic effects of board gender equality policies to mitigate the glass ceiling. While prior papers focus on short term firm level impacts, we find that the policies have long term societal impact. In particular, the policies motivate more female professionals to work full-time instead of part-time.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main ideas behind the staggered synthetic control approach to policy interventions implemented in a staggered time frame. In Section 3 we apply the proposed staggered synthetic control methods to estimate the effect of board gender diversity policies in the EU.
Synthetic Control Methods for Staggered Adoption of Policies
In this section, we propose a clear framework that enables estimation of various parameters of interest including event-time ATT (defined in Section 2.5). Our inference procedure is based on Andrews' end-of-sample instability test. We give formal assumptions under which the proposed procedure has asymptotically correct size.
A Rubin model
Consider Rubin's potential outcome model and assume SUTVA. A panel of N × (T + S) is observed for outcome variable y i,t and treatment status d i,t . The potential outcome is
For t = 1, . . . , T , no units are treated, i.e., d i,t = 0 if t ≤ T . Note that this framework rules out the impact of timing, i.e., the timing of each treatment does not affect the potential outcome so that the outcome is only a function of the treatment status. Throughout, assume T → ∞ and S and N are fixed.
The individual treatment effects are defined by
Let τ i,t = 0 for d i,t = 0 for notation simplicity. Let τ ∈ R K be the vectorization of τ i,t 's such that unit i has been treated at time t, i.e.,
Examples include event-time ATT and difference of various types of treatment assignments. See Section 2.5 for details.
An invertibility assumption
We allow for full flexibility on the form of treatment effects and do not impose any parametric restriction. Since we assume the number of units and the number of post-treatment time periods are small relative to the number of pre-treatment time periods, the individual treatment effects are not identified from the data. In order to learn useful information about the treatment effect, we discuss a key assumption in this section.
We first define the individual synthetic control weights and their limits. Namely, let
and we only consider cases where they are well-defined (see Appendix B for lower level assumptions under which a i and b i converge).
For each i and t, define the specification error by A s ∈ R N ×K such that τ s = A s τ , i.e., τ s is the "effect vector" at time T + s. We introduce the following invertibility assumption:
Assumption 1 excludes cases where all units are treated at a certain time period t. This assumption identifies the distribution of some population quantity that is centered at the true parameter, which facilitates the unbiased estimation. Note that this assumption is testable in principle, when B is identified.
Estimation of parameters of interest
As discussed in the previous section, the treatment effects are not identified, so consistent estimation is impossible. In this section, we propose an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the parameter of interest.
Stacking equation (2.2) for all i's gives
Let · be the Euclidean norm and · F be the Frobenius norm.
Assumption 2. (a) {u t } t≥1 is stationary and has mean zero.
We show that this assumption holds under stationary or co-integrated common factors when {y i,t (0)} follows a factor structure. See Appendix B for details.
The estimator for τ is given by
Then the estimator for γ = Lτ is γ = L τ . Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Then, as T → ∞,
That is, γ is an asymptotically unbiased estimator for γ. 1
Inference methods
Suppose we want to test the null hypothesis
where d is a column vector. 1 The efficiency of this estimator can be improved by estimating a covariance matrix and using it as a weighting matrix. See Cao and Dowd (2019) for details.
We propose an test that is based on Andrews' test as in Andrews (2003) and Andrews and Kim (2006) , and first applied to the synthetic control methods by Cao and Dowd (2019) .
Define the test statistic
To form the critical value, first define
and its sample analog
Note that under H 0 , P can be approximated by
In practice, one can simply let θ (t) = ( a, B) for each t. Another choice is to use the leave-S/2-out estimator (see Andrews, 2003) .
Note that P t = P t ( θ (t) ). The empirical distribution of P t is then
and the corresponding (1 − α)-quantile is
For some significance level α, we reject the null hypothesis if P lies outside the (1 − α)-
The confidence region can be constructed by inverting the test.
Assumption 3. (a) {u t } t≥1 is ergodic and has finite second moment.
(b) There exists a non-random sequence of positive definite matrices {D T } T ≥1 such that
(d) The distribution function of P 1 (θ 0 ) is continuous and increasing at its (1−α)-quantile.
We show by Lemma 1 in Appendix B that Part (a)-(c) in Assumption 3 are satisfied by either stationary or co-integrated common factors.
Comment 2.1. Assumption 2 and 3 are similar in spirit to those given by Chernozhukov et al. (2018) . It is worth noting that those assumptions do not preclude methodologies other than the synthetic control method. We focus on the synthetic control method because it has excellent performance when only moderate size datasets are available. One can easily extend our framework to incorporate other estimators when appropriate.
Theorem 2. Suppose Assumption 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then, under H 0 ,
In the same spirit of the weak IV case, even if we are not able to point-identify the parameter of interest, we can derive the asymptotic distribution of some estimator, based on which we can conduct valid inference.
Examples of parameters of interest
In this section we discuss a few parameters of interest that are common in studies with stagger implementation. For more examples on interesting parameters, see Callaway and Sant'Anna (2018) , which looks at stagger implementation with the difference-in-different estimator.
Event-time ATT
In this section we introduce how our method can be used to estimate the average treatment effects on the treated s periods after being treated (ATT of event time s). Throughout, we assume in the paper that the unit is always treated once it has been treated, i.e. d i,t ≤ d i,s if t ≤ s. Extension to cases where the unit can leave the treatment status is straightforward.
Define event time
and number of observations with event time s
Then the ATT of event time s is
That is, the proposed estimators for treatment effects and relevant parameters of interest are asymptotically unbiased. Also, hypothesis testing can be conducted using the proposed procedure in Section 2.4.
Various types of policies
It is often important to evaluate the difference in treatment effects induced by various types of policies. For example, one may want to know how the dynamic treatment effects of Quota differ from those of Disclosure in terms of female board members.
Suppose there are two types of policy implemented. For i = 1, 2, the event-time ATT at time s of the i-th policy can be written as ATT e i,s = l i,s τ for some l i,s properly defined. Then, the parameter of interest is γ = [l 1,s , l 2,s ] τ , and one may look at the hypothesis
Comparison to related methods
Our method is related to two streams of literature. First, there is a rising literature on the difference-in-difference method with staggered adoption (Borusyak and Jaravel, 2016;  de Chaisemartin and D'Haultffuille, 2018; Goodman-Bacon, 2018; Abraham and Sun, 2018; Athey and Imbens, 2018; Callaway and Sant'Anna, 2018; Strezhnev, 2018; Hull, 2018) .
Among them, the method proposed by Callaway and Sant'Anna (2018) is the most similar to ours in spirit. They estimate the block-level treatment effects and then construct estimators for interesting parameters, allowing for great flexibility. However, all of the aforementioned works rely on some notion of common trend in all units, which is likely to fail in many cases. By applying the synthetic control method, we allow for cases where common trend does not hold for at least some units. Besides, in the comparative case studies with moderate N and T , the synthetic control method often has better finite-sample performance than the difference-in-difference method does in terms of estimator variability (Ferman and Pinto, 2017) .
Another related literature is the recent works on the multivariate synthetic control method (Cavallo et al., 2013; Firpo and Possebom, 2018; Kreif et al., 2016; Robbins et al., 2017; Xu, 2017) . This literature applies the synthetic control method to cases where more than one unit is treated by the policy. In principle, each column of τ can be separately estimated by those methods. However, one common feature of those methods is that they throw away other treated units when constructing the synthetic control for a specific treated unit, while the "contaminated" units are often the most important control units. In the case where the underlying potential outcome model follows a factor structure, simply not including other treated units in forming weights can potentially cause efficiency loss in the stationary case and induce bias in the non-stationary case. It is especially so in the time periods when most control units have been treated.
Estimating the Effects of Board Gender Diversity Policies
Policy interventions to address gender equality have generated considerable debates, and in particular we focus on one that is widely adopted in many European countries: gender equality regulation on corporate boards. Proponents argue that a systematic change is needed to address the glass ceiling (European Commission, 2012, hereafter the EU Impact Assessment). Opponents claim that policies like a quota may only benefit the few female directors, as known as "the golden skirt", given the supply constraint (Huse, 2011; Seierstad and Opsahl, 2011) , and prior research finds a decrease in firm performance subsequent to these policies (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012) . One way to reconcile the two is to consider the dynamic effects of the quota policies: do we observe negative short term consequence on firm performance, in exchange for a better long term societal gender equality. Therefore, we study the implication of the policy both in the longer term and on the wider society.
Despite the importance to study societal impacts of these policies, most existing papers investigate the policies' impact on firm performance. One reason is the wider societal effects may take years to be realized, making it difficult to measure. Another reason is these outcome variables, such as labor employment, are usually observed at the aggregate level, making it difficult to study in one country. To mitigate these concerns, in this paper, we exploit the staggered adoption of board gender policies in European countries, and apply the proposed synthetic control method for staggered adoptions to examine the magnitudes of the dynamic effects of these policies.
Background
Gender equality has made great progress in the past century, but while the gender gap on higher education and entry-level employment has reduced, the gap at the higher business decision making roles remains large (Bertrand et al., 2011) . The EU impact assessment in Many papers criticize the immediate damage brought by a gender quota. From a firm perspective, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) finds that stock price dropped at the initial proposal of the quota law in Norway, suggesting firms chose their board structure to maximize firm value before the gender quota policy. They further find that the number of public firms declined substantially compared to the number of private firms, evidencing avoidance behavior as a result of the gender quota. However, a more recent paper, Eckbo et al. (2016) fails to find the same effect. Lu (2019) finds that due to supply constraint of female directors, firms subject to the quota hire more foreign female directors, and female directors with less public board experience.
These papers suggest that in the short run, quota causes distortion from the optimal market-driven equilibrium. However, these findings alone cannot speak to the desirability of the policy. It is important to study the intended benefits of a board gender policy, especially in the long run. Recently, Bertrand et al. (2018) revisits the Norwegian quota setting by studying the long term impact seven years after the quota became compulsory, they find a reduction in gender pay gap within boards, but do not find an increase in female representation or earnings in other roles outside of the board room. In other words, the quota rule benefited female directors but did not trickle down to other female leadership roles, which was also a goal of the quota mandate in Norway. They further examine other wider social impacts, and find an increase in female pursuing an education in business, but they also find the same result for engineering degrees.
Our goal is to study the long term societal effects of board gender equality policies, similar to Bertrand et al. (2018) , and expand to settings involving all European countries that announced such a policy. While many papers study the effect of these policies in specific countries, very few study across countries.
There are three channels a quota policy can bring long term benefits. First, a quota may lead firms to invest in a long term pipeline for female leadership, such as establishing mentorship opportunities. Second, the presence of female directors may motivate younger female employees to invest in career development, as they see the possibility of rising to the top. Third, diversity has a motivating role where a female in the management role can empower other junior female employees through mentoring and better work environment (Dezsö and Ross, 2012) . For example, because of her own experience, Sheryl Sandberg demanded pregnancy parking spots at Facebook, but such female oriented policies demanded by non-leadership level female employees may never be heard. All three channels suggest that in the long term, there will may be more female participating in the workplace, and many who may choose and make it to a leadership position.
In the long term, if the supply of qualified female leaders increase, many of the short term consequences, such as the golden skirt phenomenon, no longer apply. However, not all critiques of the quota policy go away, and some may even hinder the realization of the above benefits. It could be the case that corporate board member represents only a small group, which is too small to make an impact in the society. Further, board members selected based on token, instead of merit, may be less able to foster change in the company (Leszczyńska, 2018) .
Therefore, it is an empirical question whether a quota policy can lead to long term gender equality benefits in the labor market.
Data and Sample
To study wider societal effects of the board gender policies, we use labor outcome variables come from the EU Labor Force Survey (LFS), which is the largest household survey on annual and quarterly employment status covering 35 European countries. We use quarterly data from 2003Q1 to 2018Q4 at a country level, and after removing countries with missing data, we are left with 23 countries in most cases. Given the small number of countries, standard large sample asymptotics with respect to units does not apply. Specifically, the popular generalized difference-in-difference method is not ideal. It also suffers from problems such as assuming strong homogeneity in order to produce interpretable results, and requiring parallel trend. In Figure 1 , we plot the coefficients of fitting part-time female to male ratio with a generalized difference-in-difference model with country and time fixed effect. The plot shows that while the pre-trend does not show significant deviation from zero, the standard error is very large as a result of the small sample. As such, we use a synthetic control method that exploits the pre-treatment data in order to form better counter-factual prediction.
We focus on part-time employment as our outcome variable, since it captures the extent to which female is willing to invest in work. We hypothesize that fewer women will choose to go part-time because of family reasons if they see a higher chance of breaking the glass ceiling at work. Part time is defined as people in employment who usually work less than 30 hours per week in their main job. Relative to participation and employment decisions, part-time decision is more likely to be affected by the policies. This is because it is less costly to switch from working 30 hours, to 40 hours a week, compared to switching from not working, to working.
In addition to labor data, data on board directors comes from BoardEx. See table 1 for summary statistics on labor and director variables. The announcement dates of the board gender policies are hand collected from each EU countries' official website and with help from Seierstad et al. (2017) . We include countries where the policy setters introduce a quota or target for corporate board female ratio, this includes mandatory quotas and those with a disclosure requirement to comply or explain. We set treatment as the announcement quarter of a board gender policy to take into consideration any anticipation effects. See table 2 for each countries' policy.
Results

Board gender ratio
We first show the direct effect of the board gender policies on the female presentation on corporate boards. Figure 2 shows the results from the staggered synthetic control where the outcome variable is the average percentage of female on corporate boards in a country. 
Employment outcomes
Next, we examine labor outcomes. We first consider part-time employment, which we expect to decrease after the treatment event if female employees are motivated to invest more in their career. Figure 3 shows the staggered synthetic control results for three occupation groups: professional, worker, and basic employees. These categories are based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), as provided in Eurostat. For all labor outcomes, we use the ratio of female to male to control for other macro economic influence on these labor outcomes. We then take the logarithm to allow easier interpretation, especially for results based on the number of employments in thousands. Figure 3 shows that there is around 10% decrease in the part-time employment ratio for the professional occupation group, a similar but less persistent decrease for the worker occupation group, and no effect for the basic occupation group. This suggests that a higher female representation on corporate boards motivate female professionals, and perhaps workers, to take part in full-time employment instead of part-time. Under the assumption that a female employee chooses to take part in part-time employment by weighting between career success and family commitment, a higher chance of career success may deter some female from going part-time.
To further examine the validity of this result, we show this effect in two additional tests.
First, figure 3 shows the change in part-time employment for professional employees by gender. This result shows a decrease in female part-time employees, but no significant effect on male part-time employees. While the change converges to zero in latter periods, it may also suggest we are extrapolating too long, as the confidence interval increases.
Second, we look at the flip side of part-time employment, which is full-time employment, to rule out the possibility that the decrease in part-time employment is due to females choosing to leave the labor market all together. Figure 5 shows an increase in full-time employment ratio of around 4%, and only for the professional occupation group.
There are a few caveats with the current test. First, because of data limitation, the amount of observations vary across the various labor outcomes. Robustness tests limiting to a smaller subsample of observations yield similar results. Second, in order to have sufficient observations in the pre-treatment period, countries that announced a policy prior to 2010 are dropped, and this includes Norway, Spain, Finland, and Iceland.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new synthetic control method to study effects of policies with staggered adoption. Our method overcomes limitations in existing methodologies, and gives asymptotically unbiased estimators of many interesting quantities and delivers asymptotically valid inference. There is potential for a wide application of this staggered synthetic control, since many policies are replicated in other regions at different timings.
We apply the staggered synthetic control method to study how corporate board gender policies affect long term labor outcomes related to gender equality. By exploiting variation in the staggered announcement of board gender policies across European countries, we can estimate the dynamic treatment effect on gender and labor outcomes.
Our paper sheds light on the extend to which the board gender policies enhance gender equality in the labor market. We find some evidence that the policies lead to a decrease in part-time employment, and an increase in full-time employment for female employees.
This effect is limited to female in professional occupations. This may suggest the higher female representation at the board level motivates other professional female employees, and this higher likelihood of breaking the glass ceiling deter them from choosing part-time employment. We do not find effects on the extensive margin, including labor participation and employment.
While prior paper examining board gender policies focus on the short term firm level impact, we provide evidence on the long term societal impact, which is the main objective of these policies. This is feasible partly because of our proposed methodology using staggered synthetic control. Using staggered synthetic control has various advantages over existing methods to study this research question with aggregated country-level data and staggered adoption of policies. In particular, we mitigate concerns about the violation of parallel trend assumption in small sample setting, and we use all important units in forming the synthetic control, including treated units.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Using Equation 2.4, we have
The first equality is by the definition of τ s . The second equality is by Equation (2.2) . The fourth and fifth equations are by Assumption 1 and 2. Therefore,
In addition, E[V T ] = 0 by Assumption 2(a).
Proof of Theorem 2. We follow the proof of Theorem 2 in Andrews and Kim (2006) . We use fours steps to show the theorem.
Step 1. We first show P d → P ∞ , where P ∞ has the same distribution as V 1 (θ 0 ) C CV 1 (θ 0 ).
Using the result of Theorem 1 and letting L be the identity matrix, we have
so under the null,
Applying the continuous mapping theorem, we have P d → P ∞ .
Step 2. Let F (x) and q 1−α be the distribution function and the (1 − α)-quantile of P ∞ ,
By Assumption 3(c), there exists a positive sequence {ε T } T ≥1 such that ε T → 0 and P(L 1,T (ε T )) → 1. Let c T = 1/ √ ε T . So we have c T → ∞ and c T ε T → 0. By Assumption 3(b), we must have P(L 2,T (c T )) → 1. By Assumption 3(b), there exists a positive sequence
then we have P(L T ) → 1 and P(L c T ) → 0. Suppose L T holds. Then, for some θ = θ or θ = θ (t) and for some t = 1, . . . , T , we have
Note that
Combining (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3), we have
By Assumption 2(a), g t (ε T , c T , η T ) is identically distributed across t for a fixed T .
let k : R → R be a monotonically decreasing and everywhere differentiable function that has bounded derivative and satisfies k(x) = 1 for x ≤ 0, k(x) ∈ [0, 1] for x ∈ (0, 1), and k(x) = 0 for x ≥ 1. For example, let k(x) = cos(πx)/2 + 1/2 for x ∈ (0, 1). Given some sequence {p t } T t=1 , a smoothed distribution function is defined bỹ
We want to show that all four terms vanish. First note that
Thus, for any δ > 0,
where the last inequality is by Markov's inequality. Recall P(P 1 (θ 0 ) = x) = 1 and
almost surely. By the dominated convergence theorem, (A.4) implies P(D 1,T > δ) ≤ o (1) and thus D 1,T = o p (1).
For D 2,T , we have
In the inequality,k is a bound for the derivative of k. Also, note
The third inequality is by Markov's inequality. This shows D 2,T = o p (1).
D 3,T is similar to the D 1,T case. Finally, by stationary and ergodicity of u t , we have
Step 3. Now we show q 1−α p → q 1−α . Pick any small ε such that F (x)
The inequality is by definition of q 1−α . The convergence is by Assumption 3(d) and
Step 2.
Similarly,
Step 4. Finally, we show P( P > q 1−α ) → α. Under null, we have
where the convergence is by combining Step 1 and 3. This concludes our proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. This corollary is a direct application of Theorem 1 where L = l s .
Appendix B: Low level assumptions
In this section we provide a set of low-level conditions under which Assumption 2 and 3 hold. Following Ferman and Pinto (2017) and Cao and Dowd (2019) , we consider a factor model such that for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T + S,
where f t is finite-dimensional common factors. For notation simplicity, we write Y t (0) = (y 1,t (0), . . . , y N,t (0)) , Y t = (y 1,t , . . . , y N,t ) , and ε t = (ε 1,t , . . . , ε N,t ) .
Condition ST (model with stationary common factors). Assume {(f t , ε t )} t≥1 is stationary, ergodic for the first and second moments, and has finite (2 + δ)-moment for some δ > 0.
Assume cov[Y t (0)] = Ω y is positive definite.
Condition CO (model with cointegrated I(1) common factors). Rewrite Equation (B.1)
as
Assume {(f 0 t , t )} t≥1 is stationary, ergodic for the first and second moments, and has finite 4th moment. Without loss of generality, E[ε i,t ] = 0. Assume {f 1 t } t≥1 is I(1). Further assume for each i, y i,t (0) is such that weak convergence holds for T −1/2 y i,[rT ] (0) ⇒ ν i (r), where ⇒ is weak convergence and process ν i (r) is defined on [0, 1] and has bounded continuous sample path almost surely. For each i, let W (i) = {(w 1 , . . . , w N ) ∈ R N + : w i = 0, j =i w j = 1}. Assume for each i, there exists w (i) ∈ W (i) such that λ 1 i = N j=1 w (i) j λ 1 j . That is, (w (i) − e i ) is a cointegrating vector for Y t (0), where e i is a unit vector with i-th entry being one and zeros everywhere else.
The following lemma shows that under the factor model, either stationarity or cointegration implies the high-level assumptions in the paper. 
